PUCKETT vs. THE UNITED STATES.

In th7 e United States Court of Claims.
SAMIUEL M. PUCKETT VS. TIHE UNITED STATES.
1. Where the United States 'Marshal sold certain fractional sections of land as the
property of one H., and the purchase money passed into the public treasury, and
it was subsequently ascertained that the land so sold was not the property of H.,
but belonged in fact to other persons, and that 11. never had any title to them
which could pass by virtue of the sale, although the sale was made without any
notice of any defect of title, and under the marshal's assurance that he would
make a title, the sale being a judicial sale, the vendee cannot recover the amount
of the purchase money from the plaintiff in the execution, the United States.
2. The marshal is the mere minister of the law, and a due discharge of his duties
does not require him to warrant the title of the property sold, nor can he expressly
or imptedly bind the plaintiff in the execution, by any assurance or warranty
that he may make at the sale.
3. Upon a judicial sale there is no implied warranty of title.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILCHRIST, 0. J.-This claim is, substantially, an action against
the United States for money had and received. It .appears from
the petition that the United States marshal for the district of
Mississippi sold certain fractional sections of land situated in
Neshoba county, in Mississippi, as the property of one Wiley P.
Harris, to one John E. Richardson, for the sum of $10,689 41.
The claimant, and one Gooch, became sureties for Richardson for
the payment of the purchase-money, and, subsequently, the claimant
became a partner with Richardson in the purchase, and signed promissory notes for the same, payable to the United States. Suits
were instituted upon the notes, and judgment obtained thereon,
against the makers for the amount due, including interest and
costs. The claimant paid the sum of $5,000, which passed into
the treasury of the United States, and, subsequent to the payment
of the money, he ascertained that the lands sold as the property of
Harris in fact belonged to other persons, and that Harris never
had any title to them, and, consequently, no title could pass by
virtue of the sale by the United States. The sale was made without
any notice of any defect in the title, and under the assurance by the
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marshal that he would make a title at a future time; which, however, has not been done.
The claimant alleges that the consideration of the notes has totally
failed, and that he is entitled to recover of the United States the
sum of $5,000, with interest.
The assurance by the marshal that he would make a title to the
land at a future day cannot be the foundation of any right in the
claimant. Whatever evidence his declaratioo)s may furnish of his
personal liability in a suit against himself, they cannot bind the
United States. If he steps out of his official duty, and does what
the law has given him no authority to do, he may make himself
personally responsible, and the injured party must look to him for
redress. ie is the mere minister of the law to execute the order of
the court, and a due discharge of his duty does not require more
than that he should give to purchasers a fair opportunity of examining and informing themselves of the nature and condition of the
property offered for sale. The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheaton, 645.
Nor upon a judicial sale, which we presume this to have been, is
there any implied warranty of title. Neither the marshal nor the
auctioneer, while acting in the scope of their authority, can be considered as warranting the property sold, nor can the marshal do
any act that- shall expressly or impliedly bind any one by warranty. Ibid. 645. It is on the same principle that it is held in
South Carolina that there is no implied warranty in a sale of land
made by the ordinary for partition, and the purchaser who has
been evicted by title paramount cannot recover the purchase-money
back from the ordinary, though it still remains in his hands undistributed. -Evans vs. -Dendy, 2 Speers, 9.
So it has often been held that there is no implied warranty in a
sheriff's sale. Yates vs. Bond, 2 McCord, 382; -Davisvs. Murray,
2 Rep. Con. Ct. 143; Bashore vs. Whistler, 3 Watts, 490. In
South Carolina, where one purchased land at a sheriff's sale, to
which the defendant in the execution had no title, the sheriff may
compel him by action to pay the purchase-money without having
first tendered the sheriff's titles. .Moore vs. Akin, 2 Hill, S. C. 403.
As there is no implication of a warranty, the question arises
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whether, upon the principle which regulates the action of assumpsit
for money had and received, the claimant can recover of the United
States the consideration he has paid.
It is provided by the first section of the act of May 7, 1800,
(2 St. at Large, 61,) that when the United States shall have received seisin and possession of lands delivered in satisfaction of a
judgment, it shall be lawful for the marshal of the district " to
expose the same to sale at public auction, and to execute a grant
thereof to the highest bidder on receiving payment of the full purchase-money; which grant so made shall vest in such purchaser all
the right, estate, and interest of the United States in and to such
lands or other real estate." Although there is no express statement to that effect, we can make no other inference from the petition than that the lands mentioned were sold by the marshal by
virtue of the authority vested in him by this act. If such be the
case, he can do no more than to convey to the purchaser such right
and interest as the United States possessed, and therefore the case
is like that where a person releases to another all his right and
interest in a tract of land, and receives the consideration therefor.
If, in such a case, the grantee can recover of the grantor the consideration he has paid for the release, on the ground that the
consideration has failed, then this claimant has a right to recover of
the United States.
It has been repeatedly held that where money is paid for land
conveyed by deed of release and quit-claim, it cannot be recovered
back, though the title be wholly defective, unless there be fraud on
the part of the vendor. Gates vs. Winslow, 1 Mass. 65; Wallis
vs. Wallis, 4 Mass. 135; Emerson vs. Washington County, 9
Greenl. 94. In the case of Soper vs. Stevens, 2 Shep., 133, it was
held that where a note, given in consideration of a quit-claim deed
of land, and where there is no fraud, has been paid by the grantee,
the money cannot be recovered back on the eviction of the grantee
by an older and better title. In all such cases as have been cited,
the money is considered as having been paid in consideration of the
conveyance of the interest the grantor has in the premises, such as
it may be, and not in consideration that the grantor will convey a
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good title to the land. The grantee buys only what the grantor has
to sell, and where without fraud, he sells only his interest, the consideration cannot be said to have failed, so as to give a right of
action to the grantee. The United States are entitled to the benefit
of this principle, and, so far as the facts appear in the -petition,
there is no more reason for permitting the claimant to recover than
there would be for rendering a judgment for the plaintiff upon a
similar state of facts in an ordinary suit at law. Our opinion is,
that upon the case stated, the claimant is not entitled to recover,
and that there is no principle of law that would authorize us to
order testimony to be taken.

In the Supreme Court of Bhode Island, Seytember Term, 1855.
TI1031AS
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G. AREY.

1. That a debt is barred by the statute of limitations of the State in which it was
contracted, and of which both plaintiff and defendant continue citizens and residents, cannot be pleaded in bar to a suit for that debt in the courts of this
State.
2. The first coming into the State of a person is to be construed as a "return into
the State" within the meaning of sec. 2 of "an act for the limitation of certain
personal actions," (Dig. 1844, p. 221.)

This action was assumpsit upon a promissory note for $100 on
demand, with interest, payable to plaintiff or otder, signed by defendant and dated Barnstable, Mass., February 21, 1848. It was
admitted that both plaintiff and defendant had personally resided in
Barnstable since the making of the note, and that the defendant
had never been within the State of Rhode Island until the day of
the service upon him of the plaintiff's writ, July 23, 1855. In bar
of the action the defendant pleaded, first, the statute of limitations of the State of Massachusetts, to which the plaintiff demurred;
and, secondly, the statute of limitations of Rhode Island, to which
the plaintiff replied as set forth in the opinion of the court. To the
rejoinder of the defendant, also set forth in the opinion, the plaintiff demurred. The defendant joined in the two demurrers, and the
questions raised by each were submitted to the court.
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Brownell for the plaintiff, in support of the demurrers, the court
declined hearing.
.Eamesfor the defendant, contra, cited with reference to the first
plea, the reasoning of Justice Story in Le _Rog vs. Crowningshield,
2 Mason, 156, and with reference to the meaning of the word
"creturn" in statutes of limitation, Graves et al. vs. Weeks, 19 Yerm.
79; Beardsley vs. Southmayd, 3 Green, 171; Love vs. Doan et al.
5 Texas, 346-7; 11_*oore vs. Hendrich, 8 Texas, 253.
BRAYTON, J.-The question raised by the demurrer to the defendant's first plea is, whether the statute of limitations of another
State is to govern the court here. This point we think is too well
settled to be now agitated or disturbed.
These statutes are intended to affect the remedy only, and not the
contract or right of action. They simply provide that the courts
of the State enacting such laws, shall not adjudicate upon and
enforce claims or rights of action after the lapse of such periods of
time as they respectively prescribe. But they do not assume to
extinguish the right. Having the right of action, the plaintiff is at
liberty to sue in any other court which is permitted to entertain
jurisdiction and enforce his right.
By the second plea in bar, the defendant pleads the statute of
limitations of this State, the first section of which provides that the
suit shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action
shall accrue, and not after; and says that more than six years have
elapsed since the cause of action in this case accrued, and before the
commencement of the plaintiff's action.
The second section of this act provides as follows: " If any person against whom there is or shall be cause for any action herein
before enumerated, shall at the time such cause accrue, be without
the limits of this State, or, being within said State at the time such
cause accrue, shall go out of said State before said action shall be
barred by this act, and shall not have or leave property or estate
therein that can by the common and ordinary process of law be
attached, then and in such case the person entitled to such action
may commence the same within the time before limited, after such
person returns into this State." The plaintiff says in his replication
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that the defendant, at the time the cause of action accrued, was
without the limits of the State, leaving no property therein which
could by the ordinary process of law be attached, and that he did
not return into the State until the 30th day of July, 1854, which is
within six years. The defendant rejoins that the defendant never
was a resident of the State, and never was therein until the said
30th day of July. To this rejoinder the plaintiff demurs.
Upon the demurrer the defendant's counsel contends that the
defendant is not within the provisions of this section of the statute.

That it applies only to persons who have been residents here at some
time, because the word return could only apply to one who had
gone out.
We think this second point made by the defendant as well settled
as the first, and this section applies to all persons absent from the
State, whether citizens or foreigners. We cannot suppose that it
was intended to give any greater protection to a foreigner than to
our own citizens, or do more than to place them upon the same
footing. In order to do so and to give effect to the evident intent
of the statute, the word return is construed to mean a coming within
the State and within reach of the process of the court, otherwise
the plaintiff would be barred, though he never had and never could
have had it in his power to sue. Besides, the construction is for
the benefit of the defendant. If he comes into the State the second
time, he is within the words as construed by his counsel, and the
bar would begin to run from the time he comes the second time, and
not before: whereas, upon the uniform construction given to similar
statutes, it begins to run from his first coming, and so puts him
upon the same footing with citizens.
The demurrers are therefore sustained.

COMMONWEALTH vs. CRONIN.

In the Circuit Court of the City of tichmond, Va.
COMMONWEALTH VS. JOHN CRONIN.'

1. Where in the course of a capital trial the witness, a Roman Catholic clergyman,
was asked in his examination "if Mrs. C. (the deceased person) had not made to
him in the sacramental confession, acknowledgments of improper or adulterous
intercourse," Held, that inasmuch as the witness' knowledgewas not obtained in any
civil capacity or as a private individual, but in the character of a Roman Catholic
minister of the sacrament of penance, a sacrament held by that church to be an
inviolable and eternal secret, subjecting the revealer to the severest ecclesiastical
punishments in this world, and as he believed, to eternal punishment as a sacriligious violation of his oath, the communication was privileged, and that the witness might decline answering without subjecting himself to an attachment for
contempt.
2. As a general principle every person when called upon in a court of justice is
bound to testify whatever he may know touching the matter inquired of; a principle, however, subject to certain exceptions, as professional communications made
to attorneys, &c.
3. By the language and spirit of the several State and Federal constitutions, it is
obvious that religious toleration was one of the great purposes that their framers
had in view, and that they were intended to secure forever to all the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, and any other construction than
one that holds the sacramental confession a privileged communication" would be
an invasion of the constitutional boon of religious toleration.

John 1T Gilmer, for the prisoner.
l.farmaduke Johnson, for the Commonwealth.
On the 29th day of August, 1855, Margaret Cronin, the wife of
the accused, made complaint before the Mayor of the city of Richmond, against her husband for violently assaulting her, saying "that
on the night previous, at a late hour, a man named Byron came to
her chamber after she had gone to bed and awoke her by pushing
her, when she ordered him out of the room. Soon after, having
occasion to go to the water closet, as she went down the steps, she
saw Byron standing or sitting on them; she passed him and went in,
IWe are indebted to the pages of our contemporary "The
nal," for April, 1856, for this interesting case..
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and Byron soon after attempted to enter, through the window or
small opening over the door." It was proved that on the night of
the 28th of August, the prisoner went about 12 or 1 o'clock to the
room of one Edward McSweeney, the brother of Mrs. Cronin, and
told him that "he had caught Margaret (his wife) in the privy with
a man named Byron. McSweeny went with prisoner back to prisoner's room. When they got in, prisoner and his wife commenced
talking together very excitedly ; during the conversation, prisoner
struck her ; soon after, he knocked her down and she lay in a kind
of swoon. Witness went directly for the watch, and returning in
the course of half an hour, found that the prisoner had dragged or
thrown his wife into the street. It was also proved that after being
thrown into the street, she arose and attempted to return into the
house, but was thrown or kicked back into the street again, and
finally got up and went into the hext house. Mrs. Cronin's practising physician was called in to see her on the 3d of September,
when he found her very ill, and with numerous bruises upon her
person. She was pregnant at the time of the injuries received, nd
during her illness had an abortion. From the 3d of September she
grew rapidly worse, and died on the 13th of September. A post
mortem examination was held on the night of the day on which her
death occurred, when it was ascertained that her spleen had been
ruptured by a blow, and the opinion of the medical man, Dr. Beale,
who conducted the post mortem examination, was, that the rupture
of the spleen was the immediate cause of her death.
After the introduction of this evidence, the counsel for the defendant introduced as a witness the Rev. John Theeling, who deposed
that'at the request of the Bishop, he visited Mrs. Cronin, on the
6th of September, in his ministerial character as a priest of the
Roman Catholic church. He was not at liberty to say whether he
administered absolution, that ceremony coming under the secresy of
the sacramental confession.
In the course of his examination, the witness was asked by the
prisoner's counsel, if Mrs. Cronin had not made to him, in the sacramental copfession, acknowledgments of improper or adulterous
intercourse with Byron.
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To this question, it was objected on the part of the Commonweahh,
that the proper foundation had not been laid, it. not having been
proved that at the time of such supposed admission, the deceased
knew or believed that she was in extremis. Dr. Gavenzel was then recalled by defendant, and deposed that on the 6th day of September,
Mrs. Cronin seemed very restless and manifested much uneasiness,
asked him if he thought she was dangerously sick, and expressed
some apprehensions about her recovery. He asked her why she
put such questions to him. Her reply was, that if she should be in
danger, she would send for the Bishop. Dr. Gavenzel then said
that she had better do so, if she thought she would receive any spiritual good. The witness said nothing to create in her mind the impression that she was in a dangerous situation ; and she said nothing
that indicated a sense of impending dissolution.
The witness, Theeling, was again introduced, and was asked
whether or not Mrs. Cronin was a Catholic. He answered that she
was, and that no Catholic ever received the sacramental service of
extreme unction, unless they have a serious disease, which may produce death, though perhaps not proximately, but it was the duty of
the priest to administer the service before all hope of recovery was
past. This ceremony being regdrded by the church as having not
only a spiritual, but a temporal effect in restoring health, and hence
should not be delayed too long. [The witness had said in a former
part of his examination that he was sure he had administered extreme unction, though he did not remember it.] That as to what
occurred in the confessional or intimately connected therewith, he
was not allowed by the rules of the church to intimate, much less
disclose. In the sacramental confession, there was no one present
but Mrs. Cronin and himself. The former question as to the admission, by Mrs. Cronin, in the confessional, of adulterous intercourse
with Byfon being then put to the witness, he read, by permission, to
the court, the following reasons for refusing to answer the same.
"It is due to this honorable court to state briefly my reasons for
not answering the questions proposed by the counsel for the defence,
and to hesitate to do so would argue a contempt for the majesty of
the law and the dignity of this court, the dispenser of the law.
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Were I asked any question which I could answer from knowledge
obtained in my civil capacity or as a private individual and citizen,
I should not for a moment hesitate, nay more, I would consider it
my duty, to lay before this honorable court all the evidence I was
in possession of, being mindful of the precept of the apostle, ILet
every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power but
from God and those that are ordained of God, therefore he that
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation," Ron. chap. xiii., v. 1, 2.
But if required to answer any question in the quality of a Catholie minister of the sacrament of penance, when I believe God himself has imposed an inviolable and eternal secresy, I am bound to
be silent, although instant death were to be the penalty of my refusal. The question proposed by the counsel for the defence affects
me in my latter capacity, and hence I must decline to answer it ;
whilst in so doing, I most respectfully disclaim any intention of
contempt or disrespect, directly or indirectly, to this honorable court.
Is a Catholic priest ever justified under any circumstances in revealing the secrets of the sacramental confession ? I answer, No.
That no power on earth, civil or ecclesiastical,spiritual or temporal,
can ever, under any circumstances, dispense with this perpetual
obligation of secresy, so that were Pope Pius the IX. in this court,
and if I can suppose for a moment, he should so far abuse his sacred
authority, and in the plenitude of that authority, as my first spiritual superior on earth, should request, admonish and command me to
answer the question proposed, my answer would be to him what it
was to the prisoner's counsel.
I can say nothing about the matter. The law which prohibits me
from reve aling what I learn in the sacramental confession, Catholics
believe to be divine, and emanates from our Lord himself. It is a
tenet of the Catholic church, that Christ instituted seven sacraments,
neither more nor less. Con. Plorent.in Decret's ad Arm enos, Con.
Tirdent, Se88. 7, Can. 1.
It is also an article of Catholic faith that penance is one of
those sacraments instituted by Christ for the remission of sins com1.
'Cn.
1
mitted after baptism. Con. Tirdent, Ses. i4,
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And that sacramental confession forms an essential and component
part of this sacrament. Further, that the obligation of secresy is
especially connected with the divine institution of confession. For
if it would be lawful for a catholic priest in any case to reveal what
was certified to him in confession, the divine precept of confession
would become merely nugatory, and there is no person who would be
willing to disclose to a priest an occult sin, which could be made
public and blacken his fair name. Such a revelation, if permitted,
would be destructive of the divine precept of confession.
But as we cannot suppose that Christ, the eternal Wisdom of the
eternal Father, would pull down with one hand what be had erected
with the other, and as we Catholics believe he instituted sacramental confession-and for the practice of confession, secresy is absolutely necessary-we conclude that inviolable secresy is commanded by our Lord in the obligation of confessing our sins. If
then, I were so forgetful of the solemn obligations not arising simply from ecclesiastical but from the divine law, not from man but
directly from God-as to answer the question proposed, I should be
forever degraded, rendered infamous in the eye of the Catholic
church, shunned by every Catholic, and I believe by every honorable man, no matter how far his religious opinions and mine might
differ. Shunned and rendered infamous as a sacrilegious wretch,
who had trampled on his most holy and solemn obligations and violated the sacred laws of nature, of his God and of man. I would
be forever deposed from tie sacred ministry, and where the Canon,
law forms part of the civil law, be condemned to perpetual imprisonmnat in a monastery, there to repent during my life the horrid
crime I would have committed. 4 Con. Lateran, (Jan. 21. But
what is still more than all, I would violate the dictates of my conscience, that stubborn monitor, whose voice would forever whisper to
my soul black and dire sacrilege. I might endeavor to smother its
cry, but all my attempts would only add strength to its terrible reproaclies and warnings. 'You have committed sacrilege of the deepest dye-sacrilege to be punished forever, by the eternal vengeance
of a just and offended Deity.' I have endeavored thus to state my
reasons as clearly as I could for not answering the question pro-
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posed. I thank this honorable court for the kind and patient hearing which it has extended to me. Whatever may be its decision, I
shall receive it with respect."
An answer being insisted on, and objection being made by the witness for the reasons stated by him in the paper read, and filed in
the cause, and the question having been elaborately argued by the
counsel on both sides, the court took time to consider.
At the meeting of the court, on Monday, it was held that the
question was improper-the counsel for the defence having laid no
foundation for introducing the statement of the deceased, by showing that at the time of making the supposed statement she was conscious of her dying situation. At the close of the opinion upon this
point, in consequence of some observation which fell from the court,
the counsel for the prisoner remarked that the witness Theeling
would not state what occured in the confessional as to Mrs. Croniu's
apprehension of death, and stated that he would ask of the witness
the distinct question, "whether in the confessional Mrs. Cronin did
not express to him (witness) her apprehension that she was in a
dying condition," and desired the court to consider the question as
propounded, and asked the opinion of the court upon the question, as
it was his purpose to recall the witness, and thereupon the court
having fully considered the whole subject, ruled the question to be
improper, and delivered the following opinion:
MAEREDITH, J.-If
the witness be asked what the deceased stated
touching her apprehension of death during the administration of the
sacrament of penance, it necessarily raises the question of privilege
which was so fully discussed before I adjourned the court on Saturday ; and as the counsel has announced his purpose to propound
the question when the witness is recalled, and has asked me to pass
upon its competency, I will briefly assign the reasons which have
led to the decision I have formed on an examination of the subject.
The question then is, whether a Roman Catholic priest shall be required to disclose what he has received in the sacramental confession ? This disclosure, the Rev. Mr. Theeling, the Romish priest,
has declined making, and in courteous and respectful terms has assigned the reasons which control his conduct. He has not hesitate.
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to give all the evidence he knows as a private individual, and which
he has obtained from those ordinary sources of information from
which other witnesses derive theirs. It is only the secrets of the
sacramental confession, and information entrusted to him in the
sacred tribunal of penance, that he declines to reveal.
It is a tenet of the Roman Catholic church, that Jesus Christ, the
divine author of Christianity, has instituted seven sacraments, that
the sacrament of penance, of which the sacramental confession is a
component part, is one of these seven sacraments; and it is a doctrine of that church, that the same divine author of these sacraments has laid the obligation of a perpetual and inviolable secresy
on that sacrament, and this obligation is enforced by an oath administered at the time of ordination.
Should the witness make the disclosure required of him, he would
subject himself to the most serious penalties known to his church.
1. He would forever degrade himself in the eye of the Catholic
church. 2. According to the canons of that church he would be
divested of his sacerdotal character, replaced in the condition of a
layman, and be forever disabled from exercising any of the ecclesiastical functions. 3. That if he lived in a country where the canon
law prevailed, he would be liable to be lodged in close confinement
to do penance for the rest of his life. 4. According to the dictates
of his own conscience he would render himself guilty, by such a disclosure, of everlasting punishment in the life to come. Such would
be the consequences to the witness according to the recognized rules
of his church.
I shall not pause to discuss how far those common law rules of
evidence, which exempt a witness from answering 'questions, whose
direct tendency is to degrade his character, expose him to a criminal question, or. subject him to a pecuniary forfeiture. I do not
think them applicable to this case. I cannot however, close my
eyes to the dreadful predicament in which the witness stands ; if he
tells the truth he violates his ecclesiastical oath. If he prevaricates
he violates his judicial oath. If he answers yes, punished by the
.ecclesiastical law. If he answers no, punished by the municipal
law. If he answers yes, punished by ecclesiastical degradation.
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If he answers no, punished for judicial contempt. 'Whether he
lies, or whether he tells the truth, he is wicked, and it is impossible
for him to act, without acting against the laws of rectitude and the
laws of conscience.' If then it be found that the generally mild and
just rules of the common law place the witness in this exquisite dilemma, between perjury on the -one hand, and false swearing on the
other, we must look to our own laws-to our constitution and bill of
rights, which proclaim religious toleration and guarantee the free
exercise of religious worship, and see if they do not view with a
more liberal eye the religious feelings of our people, and dispense
with a more equal hand the universal and immutable principles of
Justice.
I shall consider this question in two aspects. 1. Upon authority, so far as adjudications in this country and England are to be
found. 2. Upon principles of public policy, in connection with the
guarantees furnished by our constitution in favor of religious liberty.
I. It is true as a general proposition, that every person is bound
when called upon in a court of justice, to testify whatever he may
know touching the matter in issue. This is essential to the proper
administration of civil and criminal justice; but it does not follow
that a priest is bound to disclose what a penitent confessed to him
in the exercise of a religious rite, which forms a fundamental tenet
in the church to which he belongs, and without which the church
would lose its distinctive features in the estimation of those who profess its faith. The elementary writers state in the most unqualified
terms that, clergymen of no religious persuasion are exempt from
the operation of the rule, yet when we examine the references they
cite, it furnishes no authority for the proposition. It is a little remarkable that the whole range of English reports furnish no case
in which the question has arisen in respect to a Romish priest.
This is a pregnant circumstance, and has strongly impressed me
with the conviction, that the exemption of a Catholic priest is either
a principle of law so well recognized there, that it has been deemed
useless to make it the subject of adjudication, or that the relation
of priest and penitent has been held so delicate and sacred, that no
one had the hardihood to draw aside the veil, which conceals it from
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public gaze. When I reflect that the Catholic church in that country has experienced every change of fortune, from the uncontrolled
exercise of supreme power to the sufferings of an intolerant persecution, I can upon no other principle account for this utter absence of
all authority on the point.
The only case cited by the elementary writers which seems to
furnish authority for the proposition that clergymen of no religious
persuasion, whether Protestant or Catholic, are exempt from disclosing confessions made to them, is a case reported in McNally, p.
253-255. In that case a'bill was filed to recover the estates of the
late Lord Dunboyne. The plaintiff claimed the same as heir at law,
and alleged that the will under which the defendant claimed was a
nullity, Lord Dunboyne having been a popish priest and baving
conformed and relapsed to popery, which deprived him of the power
to make a will. Issue was joined, and the plaintiff called the Rev.
Mr. Gahan, a clergyman of the church of Rome, to be examined,
and interrogatories to the following effects were, amongst others,
propounded to him. "What religion did the late Lord Dunboyne
profess from the year 1783 to 1792 ? What religion did he profess
at the time of his death and a short time before ?" The witness
answered to the first part, but objected to the second, and assigned
as a reason for his refusal, that his knowledge of the matter enquired of, if any he had, arose from a confidential communication
to him, in the exercise of his clerical functions, and which the principles of his religion forbade him to declare, nor was he bound by
the laws of the land to answer.
Sir Michael Smith, the master of the Rolls, determined against
the objection, and required the witness to answer. This case is relied on as a direct authority on the point, but a careful examination
of it will show that the question does not arise and was not decided.
It will be observed that the faot inquired into of Mr. Gahan had
not been communicated to him in the administration of a sacrament
of his church, which in its nature is to be kept inviolably secret.
The information was not obtained in the confessional. It was a
confidential communication, and the knowledge may have been derived by him from the ordinary sources of information, which daily
association afforded.
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He would not, therefore, be exposed by disclosing it, to degradation, breach of oaths, and a violation of clerical duties. It only
affected his personal honor as a gentleman.
The point did not arise in this case, and the principle, which it is
cited as authority to sustain, was not decided.
There are other cases cited in the elementary books, but an examination of them will show that they contain the mere loose dicta
of judges upon the general question of exemption, when the precise
point was not before them. Some of them in favor and others
against extending the privilege to all clergymen.
In the case of Broad vs. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518, Best, Chief Justice, said that "he, for one, would never compel a clergyman to disclose a communication made to him by a prisoner. But that, if he
chose to disclose them lie would receive them." In the case of .Du
Barre, Peake's Nisi Prius Cases, p. 77, Lord Kenyon, on being informed that Mr. Justice Buller had required a clergyman to disclose
the confessions made to him by a prisoner, remarked, "I should
have paused before I admitted the evidence here admitted." These
opinions were expressed in respect to protestant clergymen, who do
not hold such confessions to be sacred. But with how much more force
do they apply in the case of Roman Catholic clergymen, according
to whose religious creed, the confession is a sacramental rite.
So far then as the English authorities are concerned, the question
has never been decided, and comes before me untrammeled by any
English adjudication.
In the United States the question has been twice decided in favor
of exempting a Roman Catholic priest from disclosing confessions
made to him in this sacred relation.
The first case was an indictment for larceny. It was tried in the
Court of General Sessions for the city of New York, before De Witt
Clinton, Mayor, J. Ogden Hoffman, Recorder, and J. S. Douglass
and R. Cunningham, sitting aldermen. The commonwealth, to sustain the prosecution, introduced as a witness the Rev. Mr. Kholman,
the Catholic priest to whom the prisoner had confessed his guilt and
delivered the goods to be returned to the owner. The witness upon
being interrogated as to his knowledge of the transaction and the
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connection of the prisoner with it, objected to answering, upon the
ground that all his information was obtained in the confessional,
and claimed to be exempt from making the disclosure. The question on his privilege of exemption was elaborately argued, and after
having taken time to consider of their opinion, the court unanimously decided that the witness should not be compelled to answer
the question, and that the priest was not bound to disclose what was
confided to him in the confessional.
The same point was subsequently presented in another case before
the same court, and decided in the same way. The question has
never been adjudicated in any of the courts of last resort in the!
United States ; and the two decisions cited, whilst they are not binding as authority, are at least persuasive, and derive additional
weight from the eminent and learned names connected with them.
Although there are no decisions in the higher courts of the
United States affirming the principle that C.ltholic priests are privileged from disclosing what is made known to them in the confessional, yet they are privileged by express enactment in several of
the States. By a statute of New York, 2 Rev. Stat. 496, § 72, it
is enacted that ",No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions
made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination." A similar
statute exists in Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1845, ch. 186, § 19 ; and in
Wisconsin, Rev. Stat. 1849, ch. 98, § 75 ; and in Michigan, Rev.
Stat. 1846, ch. 102, § 85 ; and in other States of the Union; and
such is the law of Scotland. By a writer on Scotch Criminal Law it
is remarked: "But our laiv utterly disowns any attempt to make
a clergyman of any religious persuasion whatever divulge any confessions made to him in the course of religious visits, or for the sake
of spiritual consolation, as subversive of the great object of punishment, the reformation and improvement of the offender." (Alison,
0. L. S.)
II. Is this privilege embraced in the guarantees furnished by
our Constitution in-favor of religious toleration, and does it violate
any principle of public policy. -The Constitution of the United
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States provides that, " Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thercof."
Our Bill of Rights declares that, "religion, or the duty we owe to
our Creator, and the means of discharging it, can be directed only
by reason and conviction, not by force or violence ; and therefore
all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience ;" and our Constitution enacts
that, "no man shall be compelled to frequent, or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever: nor shall any man be
enforced, restrained, molestcd or burthened in his body, or goods,
or otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain
their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in nowise
affect, diminish, or enlarge their civil capacities."
It is impossible to conceive of more broad and comprehensive
terms than are used in our Bill of Rights, and our State and Federal Constitutions. Religious toleration was the great purpose their
framers had in view. They believed that it was the right of every
human being to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience. They designed to secure forever to all, the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, and employed language commensurate with that object. At the time they
adopted these constitutional provisions in favor of religious liberty,
the Catholic religion was in existeuce and had been "for centuries.
Penance was one of its sacraments, and confession an essential part
of that sacrament. They enacted these provisions with full knowledge of this fact, and must have intended that the Catholics should

freely enjoy their religion, including auricular confession. If they
had intended to restrict the Catholics in their mode of worship, to
deprive them of the sacramental confession, and thus strike out a
fundamental tenet in their creed, would they not have used some
words of limitation on the broad and comprehensive terms they employed ? By every rule of construction, I am forced to conclude
that they would have imposed this restraint if they had intended to
do so. if, then, the common law rule of evidence, which requires
witness to disclose all he may.know touching a matter in issue
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before a court of justice, infringes upon that free exercise of religious worship, which the Bill of lights proclaims and the Constitution guarantees, no one will deny but that the rule of evidence must
yield to the constitutional enactment. Being a rule of evidence in
existence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it is repealed by any provision in the Constitution with which it comes in
conflict; and the inquiry then is, does this rule of evidence restrict
those who profess the Catholic religion in tile free exercise of their
religious rights and privileges? In making this inquiry we must
ever keep in mind that it is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances and ceremonies should be administered,
and those who observe them should be protected; and that the sacraments of a religion are its most essential elements. What then
would be the consequence to the Catholic religion of requiring the
priest to disclose what is entrusted to him in the sacramental confession? Would any such confessions be made? Clearly not. No
criminal would seek the confessional, and in the act of penance
make known his crime, if the priest to whom he discloses itis liable
to be called as a witness to testify on his trial and insure his conviction. These confessions, which are now delivered in secret for
a purpose purely religious, 'Would not be so delivered, but would be
withheld for fear lest they should be used for a judicial purpose.
Tie'rule of evidence which would enforce the disclosure of confessions made to a priest, would operate as a prohibition of all such
confessions for spiritual purposes as could be. used for judicial purposes; and this prohibition would be secured by whatever consequence of a penal character would result from the decision, which
such testimony would warrant. Penitents would be pressed by the
whole weight of the penal branch of the law, and be prohibited from
the exercise of this essential and indispensable part of their religion
in confessing all such misdeeds as, if judicially disclosed, would have
tile effect of drawing upon them the punishment of the law. The
consequences to the priest would be equally oppressive. To him it
would be little short of persecution. What priest would receive the
confession of a penitent, when the dilemma in which he would be
placed is so terrible ? When brought to the witness stand, he must
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either violate the oath administered to him by giving false testimony,
or by disclosing what he has received in the confessional, violate the
ecclesiastical oath administered at the time of his ordination, or by
his silence be "burthened in his body" by commitment for contempt.
Is it not manifest that, neither the priest will administer the sacrament of penance, of which the confession is an essential part, nor
will the penitent receive it, when both are liable to such terrible
consequences? And if this restraint be imposed upon them, can
they be said to enjoy the free exercise of their religion, being denied
the right to partake of one of its sacraments ? In the Protestant
church there are but two sacraments-Baptism and the Lord's Supper. They are essential to the full enjoyment of that faith. Now
suppose that a decision of this court, or a law of this State, or a
common law rule of evidence, should prevent the administration of
one or both of these sacraments, would not the Constitution be violated and the freedom of religion be infringed ? and must not the
same privilege apply to the Catholic church ? Any law, or rule of
evidence, which prevents the administration of any one of its sacraments to those who profess its creed, is equally a violation of the
Constitution, and a denial to them of the free exercise of that religious freedom which the Constitution secures alike to all.
Nor will this prohibition upon the free enjoyment of the Catholic
religion, by requiring its ministers to testify as to what may be disclosed to them in the confessional, be confined in its operation in
cases of crime. It will extend to civil proceedings; and every suitor,
whose adversary is a Catholic, and whom he suspects of having
made disclosures in the confessional, touching the subject of controversy between them, will have the right to bring the priest into
court to testify to matters confided to him in that sacred relation.
The alarm which this practice would create among that class of our
people would be intense, and to them a most extreme and afflictive
grievance. And thus those who profess this faith, will be subjected
to a species of apprehension, and of petty annoyance and vexation,
utterly inconsistent with the enlarged and enlightened toleration of
our laws.
Nor will any principle of public policy be violated by extending
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this privilege of exemption to the Catholic clergy from testifying to
matters made known to them in the sacramental confession. The
advantage gained in promoting the ends of criminal justice by coercing a disclosure from the priest would be of rare occurrence. And
whilst cases may be supposed in which the concealment of a fact
communicated in penance might have a pernicious effebt, yet such
instances are rare, and furnish no foundation for the rule that they
should be required to disclose in all cases. It has been truly said,
that "to attempt to establish a general rule, or to lay down a
general proposition from accidental circumstances, which occur but
rarely, or from extreme cases, which may sometimes happen in the
infinite variety of human actions, is totally repugnant to the rules
of logic and the maxims of the law. The question is not whether
penance may sometimes communicate the existence of an offence to
a priest, which he is bound by his religion to conceal, and the concealment of which may be a public injury, but whether the natural tendency of it is to produce practices inconsistent with the public
safety," and whether public policy requires the disclosure ? To require such disclosure from the priest would be to declare, as I have
already shown, that there should be no penance and no confession.
For who would confess, when the sanctity of the sacrament of
penance is to be invaded and its secrets exposed to public gaze ?
To enforce the rule of evidence which requires such disclosures,
would be to destroy the source itself of all such evidence-and the
supposed public benefit would share the same fate-and thus the
rule would defeat itself, whilst the effort to enforce it would inflict
a grievous, continuous and unconstitutional injury on those to whom
it is sought to be applied'
It can scarcely be necessary to notice the argument which was
pressed, that this exemption of Catholic clergymen would be extending to them a privilege not enjoyed by clergymen of the Protestant
persuasion. No Protestant claims any such exemption, and they
cannot be said to be denied that which they lay no claim to. Penance and the confessional form no part of their religious creed.
They repudiate both. When this rule of evidence, or any other
principle of law, shall deprive Protestents of one of the sacraments
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of their church, and thus deny to them the "free exercise of thcir
religion according to the dictates of conscience," they should be
held exempt from the operation of any such rule, or principle of law.
But until such is shown to be the case, there is no analogy between
Protestants and Catholics on this question-such an argument is
rather more"popular than logical ; and though it may be invoked to
excite prejudice, should never be allowed to disturb the judgment.
This privilege of withholding what is made known in the confessional is not without analogy in the law to sustain it. It belongs to
every attorney or counsellor at law. All professional communications made to attorneys by clients are privileged, and no human
power can compel the attorney to disclose them. Whether he be
called as a witness, or be made a defendant, and a discovery sought
from him as such, by bill in Chancery, whatever he has learned as
counsel or attorney, he is not obliged nor permitted to discover; and
by the attorney's withholding such knowledge the innocent may
suffer the extreme penalties of the law and the guilty go unwhipt of justice. "The foundation of this rule" said Lord Chancellor Brougham,
in the case of Creenhogyh vs. G-a skell, 1 My. and K. 102, " is
not on account of any particular importance which the law
attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection. iBut is out of regard to the
interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled
in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts and in those matters
affecting rights and obligations, which form the subject of all judicial proceedings."
If such communications were not protected, no
man, as the same learned judge remarked in another case, would
dare to consult a professional adviser, with a view to his defence, or
to the enforcement of his rights ; and no man could safely come into
court, either to obtain redress or to defend himself. With how
much more force does such reasoning apply to those who seek the
aid of spiritual advisers, and whose religious creed attaches essential
importance to their interposition.
It will be observed that I have not discussed this as a theological
question.
Whether it be, as alleged, of divine origin or not;
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whether repentance and consequent abstinence from future misdeeds
of the like nature, followed by satisfaction more or less adequate for
the past, are temporal advantages quite as extensive as the good
effects to be derived from the disclosure as an aid to the administration of justice, are views which I shall not enlarge upon. But
assuming penance and confession to be a sacrament in the Catholic
church, and a tenet of faith essential to the maintenance of that
religion, I have considered it in its legal and constitutional bearings.
And in every aspect in which I have been able to view it; looking
at it as analogous to the rule which exempts attorneys from disclosing the professional communications of their clients entrusted to
their confidence ; to the fact, that in England during centuries
while the Catholic religion prevailed there no case can be found in
which the disclosure was coerced; that it is the law of Scotland, as
it is the law in several States of this Union, by express statutes to
exempt the priest from disclosing infoniaation obtained in the confessional; that no principle of public policy will be invaded; and
above all, that the great constitutidnal boon of religious toleration,
which secures to all the "free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of conscience," cannot be enjoyed by this class of our people
if the secrets of the confessional are to be disclosed, I shall hold the
priest exempt from testifying as to what was confessed to him by
the deceased in the administration of the sacrament of penance.

Court of Chancery, Mobile, Ala., Oct. 1855.
THE MARINE DOCK AND MUTUAL INS. CO. vS. JOHN H. GOODMAN, JAMES
A. MOORING, DUKE W. GOODMAN, THE FULTON INS. CO., THE FRANKLIN
INS. CO.

1. An insurer is liable for a total loss only where an abandonment has been made
and actually or constructively accepted, or where there has been in fact an actual
or technical total loss. The doctrine of some decisions, that he can be made thus
liable by reason of even the "highest probability" of an actual or technical loss,
without acceptance of aAl abandonment held to be unsound.
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2. Where an insurance has been effected in the name of one "for the benefit ofwhom
it may concern," and he abandons, the other parties interested, even if he is to be
considered prima facie their agent for that purpose, may, where they have not in
fact concurred, disavow the agency within a reasonable time, either expressly or by
their acts, and thus repudiate the abandonment. The taking possession and sale
of a vessel, by a mortgagee whose interest was insured under such general words,
after an abandonment by the mortgagor who was the nominal insurer, but before
acceptance thereof, held, to be a dissent from the abandonment.
3. After an abandonment has been made, but not agreed to, the taking possession
of and raising and repairing the vessel by the underwriter, accompanied, however
by an express refusal to accept the abandonment, is no waiver of his right to treat
it as a case of partial loss, if it prove to be so, provided there be not any assertion
of title or act of ownership on his part. -Peel vs. AlHrchants'Ins. Co., 3 Mason,
27, dissented from. That the underwriter must in such case repair and tender
the vessel in a reasonable time, is not, itwould seem, necessary. Reynolds vs. Ocean
Ins. Co., 22 Pick. 171, so far disagreecto.
4. The American doctrine of a technical total loss doubted.
5. In determining whether a technical total loss has been incurred, upon a valued
policy, the actual value of the vessel at the time of the disaster is to be taken, and
not the valuation of the policy, and the proportion of loss is to be ascertained by
deducting the cost of repairs from the value of the vessel when repaired.
6. Where a steamboat under a valued policy had been snagged and sunk in a river
in Alabama, and the underwriters while refusing to accept an abandonment, had
the boat raised, taken to Mobile, and there repaired, but the expenses of raising
the boat had been greatly increased on account of misrepresentations by the master as to her condition at the time, it was held that the question of a technical
total loss was to be determined by deducting what would have been the reasonable
cost of raising the vessel, in addition to the costs of taking the vessel to Mobile
and repairing her there, from the value of the vessel when the repairs were completed. Before leaving the vessel the master had dismantled her without necessity, held also that the cost of restoring the vessel to her former condition in this
respect, was not to be included in the computation.
7. The court considering the case to have been one only of partial loss, and the boat
having been sold by the mortgagee subsequently to the repairs, it was held that
the underwriters were entitled to claim as against the insured, for the work done
and materials furnished in and about raising, taking the boat to Mobile and there
repairing her.
8. An account in this case was directed to be taken, as follows: 1. The underwriters
to be allowed the reasonable (not the actual) cost of raising and taking the boat
to Mobile, the reasonable cost of taking care of her till possession taken by the
mortgagee, tlje reasonable cost of repairs, and any deductions required by the
policy. 2. The undetwriters to be charged with two-thirds of such cost of raising,
taking to Mobile, and repairing.
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9. The insured upon a partial loss is to be allowed the reasonable cost of taking the
vessel to the place of repairing, though in the course of her voyage, where the nature
of the disaster is such that she has ceased to earn freight or passage money.
10. A bill in equity may be maintained by one underwriter against the insured and
the other underwriters, on the same vessel, for an account and an adjustment of
the loss among the parties, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits.

Bill in Chancery.
The facts of the case as they appeared upon the bill and answer,
and from the evidence taken in the cause, were substantially as
follows :
Prior to June, 1853, J. H. Goodman and J. A. Mooring were
the owners of the steamboat Jenny Bealle. The former owned
three-quarters parts, the latter one-quarter part.
On the 16th May, 1853, J. H. Goodman mortgaged his interest
to D. W. Goodman to secure the payment of $10,500, in three notes
of $3,500 each, dated 14th May, 1853, and due respectively January 10th, February 10th, and April 10th, 1854. In default of payment of either, all the notes were to become presently due. On
14th May, 1853, Mooring mortgaged his interest to D. W. Goodman to secure payment of $1,014, due ninety days after date. By
the terms of the mortgages, possession of the boat was to remain
with the mortgagors, and they were to receive the profits till
default in payment; they were to keep the boat insured, and hold
the proceeds for the benefit of the mortgagee.
On 20th June, 1853, insurance for a year for $5,000 was effected
on the Jenny Bealle with the plaintiff. The policy was made
to J. H. Goodman "for account of whom it may concern, loss, if
any, payable to D. WV. Goodman." By agreement in the policy,
the boat was valued at $22,500; and the owners were prohibited
from insuring more than two-thirds of her value, or $15,000.
On 21st June, 1853, insurance for $5,000 was effected with the
Franklin Insurance Company, of Louisville, for' one year, and Ulon
same agreement as to value, and the amount of insurance that
might be taken. This policy was made to "J. I. Goodman, for
owners, or whom it may concern."
On 4th July, 1853, insurance for $5,000 was effected with the
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Fulton Insurance Company, also for one year and upon the same
agreement as to value, and the amount of insurance that might be
taken. This policy was made to "J. H. Goodman, loss, if any payable to J.H. Goodman."
By the policies, insurance to $15,000, the extent allowed, was
thus effected; leaving one-third at the risk of the owners.
On 13th April, 1854, while the Jenny Bealle was descending the
Bigbee river, she struck a snag, which knocked a hole in her bottom, on the starboard side of the boat, abreast of the forward part
of her boilers. She sunk directly; her forward part rested on the
bottom of the river and remained out of water; her stern swung
towards the bank of the river and grounded: the boat keeled or
listed a little to the larboard side, so as to leave the whole of her
starboard or right guard out of water: her larboard guard remained
under water, some two or three feet, and the water covered the floor
of her engine room, aft, about ten feet beyond the slash bulk-head,
and to about the centre line of the boat: her stern was in about six
feet water. At the time of the accident, the river was low, and
falling, and the boat was coming down light.
The evidence of the men who raised the boat and of the men
who repaired her, showed that one streak of plank was torn off her
starboard knuckle. The hole thus made was between twenty and
thirty feet long, and from eight to ten inches wide. Twelve to
fifteen floor timbers and three or four plank were broken; some of
her deck beams were also broken. The extent of the injury was
differently stated by the witnesses. All, however, united in stating
she could be raised, even had the water been deeper than it was,
and that the boat was not a wreck.
When the Bealle sunk, the master, J. H1. Goodman, stripped her
of all her movables and furniture, and within thirty-six hours -left
for Mobile with all his crew except two men, who were left on the
boat as watchmen.
On 21st April, Goodman reached Mobile, made his protest, and
a verbal offer of abandonment to the underwriters. The abandonment was not accepted, and of this, Goodman was promptly
informed.

INSUR.INCE COMPANY vs. GOODMAN ET AL.

Goodman, in his interview with the underwriters, represented
the boat as a perfect wreck; that she had broken down in this centre; that her whole bottom forward was torn off, and it was impossible to save her.
The underwriters, acting on these representations, though hoping
from the statements of the carpenter, that Goodman might be mistaken, on 22d Apiril, contracted vith Davis and others to raise the
boat and bring her to Mobile, agreeing to pay $5,000 if the boat
was delivered to them at Mobile, but nothing if she was not saved.
The boat was raised and reached Mobile on 18th or 19th May.
The total outlay of money by the contractors, including their passage from Mobile and all expenses incident to the delivery of the.
boat at Mobile, was $455.
The labor of raising the boat did not exceed ten days; seven
men were employed a part of that time, and a part, only five men.
The above amount did not include any compensation to the contractors. The estimate of an experienced raiser of boats, was that
the total expense should not have exceeded $1,000.
The state of the river was low and falling at the time of the 'accident, and the water actually fell at least six inches before Goodman left the boat.
All the witnesses stated that the river continued constantly to
fall for two or three weeks or more, after the accident. The assured, it appeared, made no attempt to raise the boat, and did nothing
towards saving her. No thorough examination -was made of her
condition, but the master left her as she lay in the river, and it
was upon his incorrect representations of her condition, that the
underwriters, as they alleged, were induced to incur a heavy and
altogether unnecessary expense to have her raised. In addition to
this conduct, they charged that the master increased the injury to
the boat, by stripping and dismantling her, whereby, when saved
from her peril, her value was materially lessened, and large additional
cost created to restore her.
The evidence showed that ample opportunity existed to raise the
boat-that the water fell some three or four feet, and that the
boat was afloat some two weeks before there was an opportunity to
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bring her down. This decrease of water it was asserted must have
enabled persons to inspect the injury, and to adopt the simplest
means of raising her. It was shown she was raised by actually
building a tulkhead around the hole, as she lay. No expensive
contrivances were resorted to, to weigh the boat, and raise her up,
so as to enable workmen to get at the leak-for the leak was readily
got at, as she lay in the river. Her position in the stream was favorable to being examined and repaired, for the injured side was
elevated by resting on the logs.
The evidence showed that no examination or consideration was
exercised by the master or- owners of the boat, but that the determination to claim for a total loss was summarily arrived at, and then
subsequently adhered to.
The evidence showed that the underwriters entered on the boat
by its agents with the avowed object of repairing and restoring
her to her owners-that they proceeded to carry out this object,
inviting the co-operation of the owners-that they did repair the
boat and tender her to her owners, who declined to receive her.
No abandonment or offer to abandon was proved on the part of
D. W. Goodman, the mortgagee; but it appeared, that directly upon
the repairs being completed, he entered upon possession of the boat
under his mortgages, and exercised the power of sale thereby given
him. He sold the boat, and was paid his mortgage debts. Since
the sale the boat has been running the rivers as usual-is staunch
and riverworthy, and insures as favorably as before the accident.
After the sale by D. W. Goodman, which realized $8,600, he
assigned his interest in the policies to J. H. Goodman, who brought
suit thereon against the underwriters for a total loss. These suits
were pending in the Circuit Court of Mobile.
Under these circumstances, one of the underwriters, the Marine
Dock and Mutual Insurance Company, filed its bill against all the
parties in interest.
The bill set out plaintiff's contract of insurance-the interest of
J. H. Goodman, J. A. Mooring and D. W. Goodman-the valuation of the boat --the representations of the master as to the nature
of the injury-his conduct in causing her to be stripped-the con-
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tract to raise the boat-the actual facts of injury done to her-the
expense of repairs put on the boat-the other expenses attending
the saving and repairing the boat.
It set out in general terms the other insurances effected on the
boat, but expressed ignorance of the particular terms of each contract-and ignorance of the state of the mortgage debt due on the boat.
The plaintiff asserted that the loss suffered by the assured was
partial only-claimed to have repaired the injury done the boatthat it had expended more than its share of the loss, and was entitled
to be reimbursed out of the proceeds produced by sale of the boat,
and to have a lien thereon prior to the lien of the mortgage-that
it was entitled to contribution from the other underwriters-that the
owners remained their own insurers to the extent of one-third, and
that they should contribute in that proportion-thai no right of
abandonment existed, and no valid abandonment was made-and
suggested what was conceived to be the proper adjustment of losses
between the insured and insurers.
The plaintiff asserted that its policy of insurance had been discharged by the conduct of D. W. Goodman, who was the party
interested, and had been paid his debt-leaving no interest on which
the policy could operate : and prayed that an account might be taken
of the debt due to D. W. Goodman on his mortgages-that an account
might be taken and a proper adjustnient of the losses and expenses
might be made among the parties in interest, according to the terms
of their policies and their respective initerests in the boat: that
Goodman's suits at law might be enjoined, and the.appropriate relief
administered.
Answers under oath were waived, except as to the items of discovery specifically sought.
D. W. Goodman answered, that he assented to the abandonment
by J. H. Goodman, and believed it was valid-admitted mortgage
from J. H. Goodman for $10,500 ; and from Mooring for $1,014 82that M1ooring had not paid anything on his debt-that J. H. Goodman had never made any specific payments, but had deposited
money with him-and there was due from him $5,421 91.
Admitted that he took possession of the Jenny Bealle under his
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mortgages after she had been repaired, and sold her for $8,600that he made the sale without consulting J. H. Goodman, and to
protect himself-after payment of his debt, that he has in hand
$1,591 52-admitted that he had assigned his interest in the policy
to J. H. Goodman, who had sued the plaintiff upon it.
J. H. Goodman answered, stating the interest of himself and
Mooring in the boat at three-quarters and one-quarter-stated the
accident occurred on 13th April, 1854-that forty to fifty timbers
were broken-a large part of the floor was carried away, and that
the boat broke or settled down aft or about the centre-six streaks
of her bottom plank were broken and carried away-the hole made
was ten to twelve feet long and five or six feet wide-that twelve
or fourteen of her ribs were broken-she sunk in eight feet water,
and it was impossible to raise her without a great and sudden fall
of the river.
After consultation and examination the boat was stripped, and
he came to Mobile, leaving two men to watch her.
Hie returned to the boat 25th April, and surrendered her to three
men sent up by insurance companies, and since his notice of abandonment has considered the boat as belonging to underwritersasserts that he used prudence and caution in the management of
the boat.
He admitted the boat has been iraised, but asserted it could not have
been done, but for a sudden, great and unexpected fall of the river,
not to be looked for at that season. Admitted repairs made, but
asserted the boat has not been thoroughly repaired, and that the.
cost has been far greater than the amount stated in the bill-and
that the boat required $2,000 to $3,000 more repairs to make her
as good as before the accident-that the expense put upon the
boat exceeded half her value, and if fully repaired, would be more
than two-thirds of her value when repaired-that in case a boat,
which has been running a year or two, is sunk, her character and
reputation are greatly impaired and her value greatly depreciated,
though she may have been raised.
Admitted mortgages to D. W. Goodman, and that respondent was
bound to insure for his benefit-that D. IV. Goodman assented to
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the abandonmnt-that $5,421 91 is due on his mortgage to D.
W. Goodman.
Admitted D. W. Goodman took possession of the boat and sold her
under his mortgage-he did this without notice to respondent.
Stated that insurance companies purchased the boat for $8,600,
which was more than her value, to deprive respondent of his right to
insist on a total loss: and insisted that by his notice of abandonment, he acquired vested rights, of which the underwriters and
D. W. Goodman cannot deprive him-insisted plaintiff had no lien
for its repairs on the proceeds of the boat.
Respondent did not claim any interest in the money or boat,
but as he was indebted to the mortgage, admitted his policies would
be entitled to a credit for what has been paid D. W. Goodman of
the policy to him, and that suits are pending.
James A. Mooring made answer the same in substance as J.
H. Goodman-admitted his mortgage debt to D. W. Goodman to be
unsatisfied and to amount to $1,014 82, with interest from 15th
May, 1853.
The Fulton Insurance Company answered, and set out a copy of
its policy made 4th July, 1853. Admitted injury to the boat, but
denied any liability because only two-thirds in value of the boat
should be insured.
The policy was to J. II. Goodman for his own account, loss payable to him, and was subsequent to the other insurances. J. H.
Goodman owned three-quarters of the boat, and before the date of
the policy, had morgaged his interest to ID. W. Goodman for
$10,500, which mortgage was unpaid and forfeited, and J. H.
Goodman had only an equity of redemption.
Defendant, by terms of its policy, was to be liable only for the
deficiency after other policies are exhausted-and the other policies more than cover the interest of said Goodman: that defendant
is not liable because said Goodman failed to remain on the boat
with his officers and crew, till the decision of the underwriters was
known-he neglected to labor and travel to save the boat, but
wantonly stripped and injured her.
Defendant was not liable, because the expense of repairs proper,
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deducted one-third new for old, and computing according to the
agreed value of the boat does not amount to 7 per cent. on the
value of the boat.
The agreed value was $22,500-but that was asserted to be a gross
over-valuation by J. H. Goodman, and that she was not worth more
than $15,000.
The injury was small, the river-was low, and Goodman should
have raised her, and brought her to Mobile, but he greatly misrepresented the injury, and thus induced defendant, with the other
underwriters, to make an extravagant contract to raise the vessel.
This has been done, and was done in order to repair and return
her to her owners. The true salvage service, was worth not more
than $1,000, whereas said Goodman, by his conduct, induced an
expense of 55,000----of which the underwriters should not bear more
than $1,000.
The boat was well and promptly repaired and tendered to her
owners, who should have accepted her, but who refused so to do.
That D. W. Goodman was entitled to the possession of the boat
under his forfeited mortgage-that he acquired this right by the
mortgage of J. H. Goodman-that D. W. Goodman entered- upon
and sold the boat and has delivered possession of her.
The sale of the boat was injured by the dismantling done by
order of J. H. Goodman.
Admitted plaintiffshould be paid for its repairs beyond the amount
due on its policy, but denies defendant is liable to pay anything
-that J. H; Goodman has brought suit, but denies he should recover anything, because more has been paid than was due, and if
any loss is chargeable to insurance companies it is only for their
proportion of repairs proper, if they exceed the reserved per centage, and a proper proportion of the true value of salvage, which does
not exceed $1,000.
Defendant claimed to be reimbursed from sale its advances for
salvage, because these advances were made without knowledgedid not claim this as against the other insurers:
Submitted to the judgment of the court, and insisted the value of
repairs and proper value of salvage service should be charged on
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the whole value of the vessel-one-third charged to owners, as not
covered by insurance. Of balance to defendant, only such part
of one-third as was equivalent to the interest of J. H. Goodman at
the time of loss :-that D. W. Goodman should be charged with
the proportionate part of the loss which falls to so much of his
mortgage as was due and unpaid, as the same was not covered by
defendant's policy :-that the proper amounts be charged to the
prior insurers.
The Franklin Insurance Company submitted its case to the court,
with a copy of its policy, and relied on a proper adjustment being made thereunder.
P. Hamilton, for the complainant.
, for the defendants.
KEYES, Ch.-The first question that I propose to examine in this
cause, is whether the complainant is liable for a total loss ?
It may be deduced from some of the authorities that there are
four cases in which the assured may abandon the thing insured to
the underwriter, and hold him responsible for a total loss.
1. When there has beeh an actual total loss.
2. When there has been a technical total loss.
3. When there is the highest degree of probability that a loss
amounts to an actual total loss.
4. When there is the highest degree of probability that a loss
amounts to a technical total one.
I think that some of the authorities have pushed the doctrine
beyond its true extent, and that the misapprehension has crept in
by not attending to the distinction between those cases in which an
abandonment fixes the responsibility of the underwriter, whether he
accept or not, and those cases in which he is not liable for a
total loss unless he accept the abandonment. When a loss, whether
it be partial or total, occurs, and the assured abandons and the
underwriter accepts the abandonment, the agreement is binding and
cannot be avoided except for some reason that would avoid any other
agreement. But when an abandonment is made and the acceptance
of it declined, the underwriter cannot be held liable for a total loss,
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unless it be proved that an actual total loss or that a technical loss
has occurred. It matters not what the assured knew nor what his
means of information were, for tMe real state of the loss at the time
of the notice of abandonment is the proper and safe criterion of the
rights of the parties. lJRarshall vs. Delaware Ins. Co. 4 Cranch,
202; . inelander vs. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, Id. 29. Subsequent events may be used as evidence to show what the state of
facts was at that time, but for no other purpose.
When a probability of total loss exists, both parties may take the
chances. It would be but prudence on the part of the assured to
abandon and give notice whenever he is satisfied that the loss
amounts to a technical total one, since he cannot otherwise fix such
a loss upon the underwriter, and it would be but prudence on the
part of the underwriter to decline an acceptance of the abandonment, unless he should be satisfied that the loss exists, since otherwise he would be bound for a total loss, when perhaps but a partial
one had occurred.
Probability then, seems to have nothing to do with the matter,
except as a result of evidence upon which the parties may act, and
upon which a jury or court may decide the controversy. Discarding, therefore, the cases of abandonment based upon probability, I
assert the doctrine to be, that an underwriter cannot be made liable
for a total loss in any other than in one of these three cases :
1. Where an injury less than a technical totalloss has occurred,
and the assured has abandoned, and the underwriter has expressly
or constructively accepted the abandonment.
2. Where there has been an actual total loss.
3. Where there has been a technical total loss.
The doctrine asserted is approved by the contract itself, for it is
a contract of indemnity, a contract to answer for loss, not for the
probability of it.
It is admitted by the complainant that a partial loss has occurred.
An abandonment must be made by every party interested; but it
is said that when several persons are interested in a vessel and some
of them cause a policy to be effected on the behalf of himself and the
others, that he who caused it to be effected is to be considered as
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the agent of the others, and therefore competent to give notice of
abandonment. Hughes on Insurance, 431. In such case, however,
the party giving notice must assume to act -as the agent of the
others, and that does not appear to have been done in this case so
far as the mortgagee is concerned. Admitting, nevertheless, -that
John I. Goodman, who gave the notice, did assume to act as agent
of the mortgagee, and that the mortgagee had the right to avail
himself of it, yet it is clear that lie had also the right to disavow the
agency within a reasonable time, and to assert his rights under the
mortgages. If the mortgagee had done nothing by which the
agency of John II. Goodman was ratified, I think that the taking
possession of the boat and selling it was a disavowal of the agency
of JohnTI1. Goodman, and that the disavowal was made in a reasonable time. If, however, the abandonment was once perfected by.
the mortgagee, then he could not in any way affect the claim of the
mortgagors for a total loss. The only effects that the action of the
mortgagee could have in that case for or against the mortgagors,
would be to substitute the underwriters to the place of the mortgagee,
qzoad the amount to which the mortgage became thereby entitled
to a credit, and to deprive the mortgagee of any further claim by
way of lien.
It may be admitted that the mortgagee- was' willing that the
insurance companies should pay him the amount due on his mortgages, but I cannot find the testimony which shows that he ever
relinquished his claim to the boat.
But the testimony shows that the underwriters did not accept the
offer to abandon, unless it be that taking possession of the boat and
repairing it amounts to an acceptance, though done under an express refusal to accept the abandonment. I cannot persuade myself to follow Peel et al. vs. The Merchants' Ins. Co., 3 Mason, 27,
though the learned judge who delivered the opinion in that case
argues at some length to show "what would be the mischi'efs and"
embarrassments attending this novel doctrine." The "novel doctrine" is, that an underwriter may upon an abandonment for a technical total loss refuse to accept it, and may nevertheless take'possession of the vessel, and demonstrate, by repairing, whether the loss
be in fact a technical total one.
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Consider for a moment the consequences of denying this doctrine.
The assured cannot do anything with the vessel without waiving his
claim for a tbtaV-loss,--n-or can the underwriter do--anything- with it
without Making himself liable for a total loss, though in fact it be
but a partial one. The vessel must remain without an owner until
the contest shall have been decided, and as Judge Story feared
would be the case in 3 Mason, the property "may perish in the
contest."
Look now at the consequences of admitting the other doctrine.
The underwriter repairs the vessel, and if the cost of repairs show
that there was a technical total loss, he is bound for it, notwithstanding his refusal to accept the offer of abandonment ; if on the other
hand it be shown by the cost of repairs that a technical total loss
had not occurred, the assured gets all that he could have gotten had
the vessel been left to perish in the contest, provided the truth could
have been shown. He could not have recovered more than twothirds of the cost of repairing, and that is what he gets by keeping
the vessel when it is repaired, or by selling it then if he prefers the
money.
The tendency of the doctrine, then, strongly commends it, for it
subserves one great end of law, viz., the preservation of property;
it relieves the administration of the law from the uncertainty of the
testimony, and.it saves to all parties their just rights.
The case is one sui generis. When the assured abandons and
gives notice to the underwriter, and he refuses to accept, the thing
insured is a thing without an owner as between the parties. The
underwriter may, therefore, take possession of it as he-would of any
thing else that is abandoned by its owner. But he cannot do any
thing that amounts to an assertion of title, for that would be an
acceptance of the abandonment. He cannot, therefore, sell it, or
destroy it, or use it for profit. He cannot retain it from the assured when demanded, for that also would be an assertion of title,
and therefore an acceptance of the abandonment. He may, however,
like the finder of a chattel, do anything for the advantage of the
owner not inconsistent with his title. Thus, if a watch-maker were
to find a broken watch, he might repair it without making himself
liable in trover.
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It cannot be said that the underwriter in such case takes possession, or repairs against the will of the assured, for as already said,
the assured cannot have any will about it ihilst he perseveres in
his abandonment.
It is common learning that a man's acts may be explained by his
declarations, whenever the acts and declarations are not inconsistent.
The possession of an underwriter upon an abandonment is not inconsistent with his refusal to accept the abandonment, since it may be
attributed to his right to take any chattel personal that is abandoned by its owner. His possession cannot, therefore, be taken as "decisive evidence of an acceptance," under the policy of insurance.
I think it is quite clear that there is a difference between the case
of an abandonment and a case of partial injury without abandonment, and that it is not true that, "1if the underwriter has a right to
repair in one case, he has in all cases." It is asked inPeel et al. vs.
The -Merchants' Ins. Co, the case before cited, "At whose risk
would the ship be during the repairs ?" I reply, at the risk of him
to whom it should be determined by the suit that the vessel belonged. It is further asked, Could the owner sell her so as to
oust the right of the underwriter to repair, or must he sell her curn
onere ?" I reply, that a sale by the assured would be a waiver of
his claim for a total loss. It is further said, " suppose an attachment on the property," and to that supposition I say that a court of
equity would enjoin.
My conclusion then, is, that the underwriter in this case did not
accept the abandonment by taking possession of the boat and repairing it, and this conclusion is in accordance with Peele vs. Sztffolkc
Ins. Go., 7 Pick. 254, and with the opinion in Commonwealth 1ns.
Co. vs. Chase, 20 Pick. 142; in Reynolds vs. The Ocean Ins. Co.,
22 Pick. 191; 1 Metcalf, 160 ; Griswold vs. The New York Ins.
Co., 1 Johns. 205, which are cited 2 Am. L. 0. 217-220. And I
may add here that the qualification of the doctrine asserted in
Reynolds vs. The Ocean Ins. Co., that the underwriter must
repair and tender the vessel within a reasonable time, seems to
be unwarranted by the principle upon which the underwriter takes
possession and repairs. It is admitted that the loss in the case is
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not an actual total one, and the inquiry alone that remains on this
branch of the cause is, whether the loss amounts to a technical total
loss ?
If I were left free to determine what damage to a vessel amounts toa
technical total loss I should follow the English cases, and reject what
has been called "the more sensible French rule" and which has
been adopted .by some of the American courts. The policy, however, issued by the complainant, precludes all question on that point
by declaring that the damage must be fifty ler centum on the interest of the assured, in order to entitle the assured to claim for a total
loss.
Courts in this country differ in regard to the rule by which the
value of the vessel should be estimated in ascertaining whether an
injury to a vessel amounts to a technical total loss. The rule which
takes the actual value at the time of the disaster is-the one which
seems to me to give the correct result, though the rule is theoretically incorrect. The value of the policy is binding upon the parties when the assured sues for a total loss, and there is no just reason
why it should not be used in the one case as well as in the other, as well
for the underwriter as against him. It is indeed a violation of the
contract to subtract the actual loss from the value of the policy, for
the value of that portion of the vessel which is destroyed is as much
fixed by the policy as is the whole value of the property. Men differ about value. Loss is merely relative, and cannot be determined
without fixing value. The assured and the underwriter have the
right to fix it, and when they do so their agreement is binding upon
both, whenever the amount of value comes in question between them,
unless the agreement can be avoided upon some ground known to
the law of contracts. If, therefore, they fix the value of the vessel
at $20,000 and the damage amounts to 50 per cent., the damage
must be computed between them at $10,000. If witnesses say that
the actual value of the vessel was $10,000 and that the damage is
$5,000, they say precisely what is said in the other case, viz: that
the vessel is damaged 50 per cent. The only legitimate object of
testimony on the question, is, therefore to ascertain the proportion of
loss and the difference between the witnesses and the parties as to
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the value of the vessel, and as to the sum which the loss should be
counted, is quite immaterial.
Courts in this country differ also upon the question whether onethird new for old should be deducted from the value of the vessel
before the cost of repairs is subtracted from the value, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a technical total loss' or not ?
If the value of a vessel is increased by repairs, it is clear that
the increase should be deducted from the value when required, in
order to get the value at the time of the disaster. If, however, the
vessel be not repaired, and the cost of repairing is to furnish the
diminuent, and the value of the vessel at the time of the disaster the
subtrahend, it is clear that one-third of the cost of repairing should
be taken off before the subtraction of it from the value of the vessel,
if it be true that repairs would be worth one-third more than the
old work.
But the question is not, whether the vessel after being repaired is
a better one for use, but what proportion of its value has been
destroyed. It is true that the underwriter does not insure the
reputation of a vessel, but still if the accident impairs the value of
it when repaired, that depreciation rightly enters into the valuation
of the vessel whenever the value at the time of the disaster is attempted to be educed from the value after it is repaired.
I am satisfied that it is as true that the market value of a vessel
is injured to the extent of one-third the cost of the repairs as it is
that the new work is worth one-third more than the old. Instead,
therefore, of embarrassing each case with the adjustment of such
loss and gain, I think it is better to exclude them both, and to hold
that the question of technical total loss shall be 'determined by deducting the cost of repairing from the value of the vessel when repaired. That rule, I have said, gives the correct result, though the
rule itself is theoretically incorrect. The rule theoretically.is this:
Take the cost of repairing for a numerator, and the value of the vessel when repaired at the place of repairs, for a denominator, and
the fraction thus made will be the proportion of the loss to the value.
The items 'which rightly enter into the numerator in this case, are :
The reasonable cost of raising the boat, taking it to Mobile, and of
32
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repairing the damage resulting from the snagging, sinking, and
raising of it. The denominator is the value of the boat not dismantled, and with the repairs of the damage done by snagging,
sinking and raising, completed.
The underwriters paid $5,000 for the raising and delivery of the
boat at Mobile. The testimony shows that the amount is much
larger than the reasonable cost of doing it. I cannot say precisely
the amount of the reasonable cost, but I think it is quite certain
that it does not exceed $800 or $1,000. The cost of repairs, which
were made before the sale of the boat by the mortgagee, does not
amount to $2,000. The boat was sold with part of her furniture
aboard and the damage done by dismantling unrepaired, for $8,600
at the sale under the mortgages.
That statement of the matter makes the loss but a partial one. It
is said, however, that the repairs made before the mortgagee's sale
did not cover the injuries which the boat had received. I cannot
undertake to say what the cost of the additional repairs would have
been, but I am strongly inclined to the opinion that it could not
have been sufficient to have made the cost of raising and -repairing
amount even to half the price for which the boat was sold at the
mortgage sale. Had the additional repairs been made, or had the
boat not been dismantled, it would doubtless have sold for a larger
price. That such would have been the effect, may be inferred not
only from the fact that the value of the boat would have been enhanced, but also from the fact that subsequently, less than $4,000
was expended in painting, refurnishing and making some other repairs, and the boat was then resold for $15,000.
I have excluded from the cost of repairing, the injury thal was
done by dismantling the boat, because it did not result from the
accident, nor was it necessary for the raising of the boat, nor for
the preservation of it, or of the things removed. There was no
probability of injury to the things removed, or of their loss, unless
the river should riseseveral feet. The river was falling, and there
were no indications of rain when the dismantling .was begun, and
even if there had been, it would have been quite soon enough to have
tommenced when it became apparent that a considerable rise might
be expected.
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It is said in the defence, that the boat was bid off by the underwriters at a price'beyond its value, for the purpose of turning the
loss into a partial one, but the testimony shows that the price was
about the value of the boat as it then was.
Notwithstanding I am persuaded by the testimony before me,
that the case is not one of technical total loss, yet as there must be
a reference to the master, I will direct him to ascertain amounts
more precisely than I can now obtain them, and I will reserve the
point until the hearing upon his report.
Assuming, then, that the loss is a partial one, it becomes necessary
to examine what are the rights of the parties upon that basis. The
underwriters having raised the boat, conveyed it to Mobile, and
caused repairs to be made, it is necessary to inquire whether they
have any claim on that account against the assured ?
There can be no doubt on that point in this case, if it be one of'
partial loss, for the mortgagee took possession of the boat after the
repairs were made, and sold it under his mortgages. But independently of that fact, I think that an underwriter has a claim for work
done and materials used in and about raising, taking to the port of
necessity, and repairing the vessel. It is true, as Mr. Phillips says,
the precedents cited in the Commonwealth Ins. Co. vs. CT7ase, 20
Pick. 142, do not sustain the claim. It seems to me, nevertheless,
that the claim is sustained by principle. In case of marine loss the
claim for raising the vessel might be sustained as salvage, but that
ground is not broad enough to sustain a claim for general repairs.
It is better, therefore, to place the whole claim upon another ground,
which is as broad as it is satisfactory. "If one accepts or knowingly avails himself of the benefit of services done for him without
his authority or request, he shall be held to pay a reasonable compensation for them." Abbot vs. ffermon, 7 Greenl. 118 ; W'eston
vs. Davis, 24 Maine, 374. The assured who abandons his vessel
and then asserts title to it after it has been recovered and repaired
by the underwriter, knowingly avails himself of the services of the
underwriter, and he must therefore be held chargeable for them.
The next question is in regard to the items which enter into the
underwriter's claim in this case. They are: 1st. The reasonable
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cost of raising the boat. 2d. The reasonable cost of taking it to
Mobile. 3d. The reasonable cost of taking care of it after it was
raised until it was started to Mobile, and for such other time prior
to the taking possession by Duke W. Goodman, the mortgagee, as
it was under the care of the repairers, and was taken care of at the
cost of the underwriters. 4th. The reasonable cost of the repairs
made by the underwriters before the sale by the mortgagee. 5th.
The deductions, if any, required by the policies.
The other side of the account must be made by charging the
underwriters with two-thirds of the reasonable cost of raising the
boat, taking it to Mobile, and of repairing the damage done by the
snagging, sinking, and raising of the boat. The master will not confine himself to the repairs made, but to such as should have been
made to repair the damage done in the several ways mentioned.
The authorities do not seem to allow the expense of taking the
vessel tQ the place of repairs, unless it be out of the course of the
vessel, to be charged against the underwriter, but that seems to me
most unreasonable, whenever the vessel by reason of the accident is
unable to earn freight or passage money.
I do not know that I need add any further instruction to the
master for stating the accounts, except the general ones, to take the
policies as a guide on such points as their terms cover, and to make
such reasonable allowances herein omitted as may be suggested by
the parties.
He must also ascertain what the value of the boat would have
been at the mortgage sale, had the repairs from snagging, sinking
and raising, been complete, and the boat had not been dismantled.
It will be seen that I have not allowed the underwriter to claim anything by reason of the bad bargain made in relation to the raising
and delivery of the boat, but there was no obligation upon them to
raise or repair, and I do not know any ground on which the claim
can rest. It is true that the bargain was made upon the statement
of facts given by Captain Goodman, and that the statement was incorrect, but that is immaterial, and besides, I am satisfied that he
was honestly, though hastily, mistaken.
It is said that the bill is without equity, but I have no doubt on
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that point. It seems to me, that the bill is sustained by the doctrine of avoiding multiplicity of suits, if no other ground coula be
discovered.
I decline to enjoin the suits at law at this time. If they, or either
of them, should be tried before the hearing on the report, a certified
copy of the judgment may be filed, and the parties in this cause
may take such supplemental steps as they shall be advised in that
respect.
There is an agreement between the underwriters which renders it
unnecessary to go into the equities which exist between them.
I do not think it is necessary to decide the other points made in
argument, and my labors press me too closely to allow me to examine
and discuss them at this time.
Let the following order be entered:
This cause is submitted on bill, answers and testimony, for a decree in vacation, and upon consideration, it is ordered that it be referred to the registrar, as master, to ascertain the amounts and to
state the account according to the opinion, and that in doing so, he
will look to the evidence on file, and to such other evidence as may
be offered by the parties;
It is further ordered that the master report at the next term, and
that he accompany his report with a note of the oral testimony adduced before him, and also with such other evidence not on file, as
may be obtained in his investigation.
And it is further ordered, that Duke W. Goodman be enjoined
from paying to John H. Goodman, or to Mooring, any part of the
proceeds of the sale of the boat.

